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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction & Background 
 
As stated by Stephen Harris, a mere 30 years ago, the idea of commercial cyber-attack was 
rather a topic for the science fiction novelists than reality.’1 However, nowadays we witness a 
growing tendency of reoccurrence of this phenomenon across many sectors that rely on 
progressively advancing technology. Despite always being known as a conservative field, the 
maritime industry is no exception in terms of the exposure to risks that result from cyber-attacks.  
For decades, the commercial ships relied on radio telecommunication for navigation 
purposes, however, just like the most of the industries, also maritime is evolving and towards 
digital transformation.2,3 This era has brought many benefits, but simultaneously also new risks 
and challenges for ships (i.e. offshore) and ports (i.e. onshore), as new tools get continuously 
implemented across various business areas. 
It is no secret that the ships and ports are becoming increasingly dependent on the 
information technology for both, onshore and offshore operations4, and therefore also 
progressively prone to cyber risks, which represent a threat to the entire digital world.5  
As implied above, the Cyber risk or the damage resulting from cyber-attack is an emerging 
danger that continues to evolve alongside with the tech advancements. It encompasses complex 
challenges that the shipping industry (i.e. ship-owners and the insurance market) is not prepared 
to prevent or manage. The cyber-attacks are seen to cause an unforeseen extent of financial 
 
1 Jacques Moss ‘How will the Marine Insurance Industry Respond to New Sources of Risk?’ Maritime, Legal, 
Regulation and Insurance 11 May 2018, available at https://knect365.com/shipping/article/593a4ff5-64bd-44a2-af7a-
9806ee9e5f94/how-will-the-marine-insurance-industry-respond-to-new-sources-of-risk, accessed on 25 August 2019. 
2 Amitava Chakrabarty ‘What Marine Communication Systems Are Used in the Maritime Industry?’ Marine Insight 
22  November 2019, available at https://www.marineinsight.com/marine-navigation/marine-communication-systems-
used-in-the-maritime-industry/, accessed on 02 January 2020. 
3 Cyber Risk Management Project CyRiM Report 2019 Bashe ‘Attack Report - Global infection by contagious 
malware’ 10 January 2019 at 2, available at https://www.financialinstitutionslegalsnapshot.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/161/2019/02/CyRiM-report.pdf, accessed on 20 December 2019. 
4 Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty ‘Safety and Shipping Review 2017: An annual review of trends and 
developments in 'shipping losses and safety at 34, available at                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
available at https://www.agcs.anz.com/content/dam/onemarketing/agcs/agcs/reports/AGCS-Safety-Shipping-Review-
2017.pdf, accessed on 05 January 2019. 
5 Baltic International Maritime Council ‘The Guidelines on Cyber Security on Board, Version 3.0’ BIMCO at 13, 
available at http://www.ics-shipping.org/docs/default-source/resources/safety-security-and-operations/guidelines-




damage, which led the marine insurance companies to incorporate several devices, which limit 
their liability for damage protecting the business from the risk of bankruptcy.6  
As much as this can be beneficial for the insurers, this has left a significant marine insurance 
gap, also known as underinsurance, as the exclusion of the cyber risk instances is meant to preclude 
the coverage. The author of this dissertation is of the view that the primary goal should be to 
minimize the cyber risk by filling the insurance gap, while establishing an acceptable solution for 
the insurers as well as the insured in a form of lowered risk and affordable premiums.  
It is essential to realize that any disruption of the shipping logistics and transportation system 
could cause serious damage and billions of dollars in financial loss, since the shipping industry 
contributes to 90% of the global economy through goods carried by sea;7 involving some 60,000 
merchant ships.8 Hence, it is important that cyber risks are eliminated in order to avoid any 
economic commotions which would significantly affect the global trade.  
Besides the mentioned technological advancements, the increase in occurrence of cyber risks 
was also contributed to by the introduction of Regulation 19 of SOLAS Chapter V 9, as it requires 
the vessels to operate on new technological navigation systems; e.g. AIS, GPS, etc.  
Since then, the vessels have become more vulnerable and susceptible to hacking and cyber-attacks 
are more common due to increased dependence on technology and remote access respectively.10 
According to Malik et al. the containerships appear to be more prone to be targeted, due to their 
apparent commercial value and constant offshore presence, which can be illustrated on numerous 
cyber incidents taking place in recent years. 11 
 
6 Regulation (EC) No 392/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the liability of 
carriers of passengers by sea in the event of accidents, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32009R0392, accessed on 22 January 2020. 
7International Maritime Organisation (IMO) ‘Human Element’, available at  
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/HumanElement/Pages/Default.aspx, accessed on 11 January 2020. 
8Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty ‘Cyber Transparency and Risk Management’ available at 
https://www.agcs.allianz.com/news-and-insights/reports/shipping-safety.html, accessed on 12 October 2019. 
9International Maritime Organisation ‘SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) chapter v safety of navigation’ published on 1 
July 2002 , available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Facilitation/Documents/SOLAS%20V%20on%20Safety%20of%20Navigation.pdf, 
accessed  11 January 2020. 
10 Julian Clark ‘The Changing Face of Maritime Law and Risk – Cyber, E-Commerce, Automation of Vessels’: 
Maritime 2019’ in International Comparative Legal Guides 2019, ICLG.COM 30 July 2019, available at 
https://iclg.com/practice-areas/shipping-laws-and-regulations/2-the-changing-face-of-maritime-law-and-risk-cyber-
e-commerce-automation-of-vessels, accessed on 9 September 2019.  
11 Malik Shahzad Kaleem Awan and Mohammed A. Al Ghamdi ‘Understanding the Vulnerabilities in Digital 
Components of an integrated Bridge System (IBS)’ (2019) 7 MDPI (Journal of Marine Science and Engineering) at  




In 2016 alone, nearly 300 ships were ordered to return to their port of origin, because of their 
navigation system being infiltrated, and as a result, the vessels transmitted false navigation 
information.12  Similarly, in June 2017, at least 20 ships had their GPS navigation hacked in the 
Black Sea region. This not only led to their spoofing and subsequent return to the port until the 
problem was fixed, but also resulted in shipment delays and therefore significant commercial 
losses. 
Besides other, this study will show that incidents like this expose shipowners to significant 
financial risk, which is further intensified by the already mentioned insurance gap, as such business 
disruptions represent a significant risk to shipping companies.13 Likewise, should a major cyber-
attack be a subject to insurance cover of a single underwriter, it may lead to significant financial 
toll and potentially result in bankruptcy of the insurer, which demonstrates how complex this issue 
really is. 
It is clear that cyber-risk is now a new form of piracy,14 in the sense that the modern pirates 
perpetrate their attacks or robberies in a modernized way by using technology.  Such analogy is 
not far from reality as the pirates have always been known for taking over vessels on the high sea 
by boarding on the ship, while recently, they have become technologically savvy, skilled and 
innovative, as they execute their plan by not boarding on the ship but rather by hacking navigation 
system of the vessel.15 
 
Scope of the dissertation 
 
It will be argued that, as with all indemnity insurance covers, pricing insurance cover at reasonable 
and competitive levels requires accurate assessment and comprehensive management of these 
risks. The dissertation will also explore how insurers can deal with such virtual threats through 
 
12 Julian Clark ‘The Changing Face of Maritime Law and Risk – Cyber, E-Commerce, Automation of Vessels’: 
Maritime 2019’ in International Comparative Legal Guides 2019, ICLG.COM 30 July 2019, available at 
https://iclg.com/practice-areas/shipping-laws-and-regulations/2-the-changing-face-of-maritime-law-and-risk-cyber-
e-commerce-automation-of-vessels, accessed on 9 September 2019. 
13 Dana Goward ‘Expert Opinion: Spoofing attack reveals GPS vulnerability’ GPSworld 18 July 2017, available at 
https://www.gpsworld.com/expert-opinion-spoofing-attack-reveals-gps-vulnerability/, accessed on 11 November 
2019.  
14 Luke Graham ‘The new face of piracy: cybercrime is threatening the shipping industry’ CITA.M. 26 November 
2018, available at https://www.cityam.com/new-face-piracy-cyber-crime-threatening-shipping-industry/, accessed on 





gathering and use of the historical information as well as those obtained from the insured. 
Likewise, it will be suggested that insurers should utilize the contractual tools already available to 
them, in order to manage the risks and control the level of their liability exposure.  
In line with the aim of the dissertation defined below, the study will describe how the marine 
insurers handle the challenges of cyber risks and provide critical recommendations on how such 
matters shall be dealt with in the future. Subsequently, the author will justify these suggestions and 
describe what makes them more appropriate over others. Given the fact that this paper focuses on 
relatively emerging risk which is likely to demand a suitable insurance cover, the goal is to 
elaborate on how this cover should be provided rather than if at all.  
Many academics and legal researchers have written on cyber-attacks and cyber awareness; 
however, nothing has been written on the challenges faced by the insurers in providing insurance 
cover against cyber risks. The dissertation will therefore also elaborate on the issued guidelines 
that serve as a preventative measure for the cyber risk management and compare the existent 
insurance products based on their relevancy in relation to the discussed insurance gap. 
Lastly, the author will portray a view on how the identified underinsurance may be 
eliminated or at least reduced when insurers see benefit in providing cover against such risks; i.e. 
once they are confident in managing their levels of exposure to liability for claims relating to losses 
arising from the materialization of cyber-attacks. 
 
Aim of the dissertation 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to consider how marine insurers and policyholders can deal with the 
challenges presented by cyber risks, contributing to reasonably priced marine insurance cover. 
Concurrently, the goal of this paper is to generate possible ways of how to manage the identified 
cyber risks and subsequently formulate recommendations to eliminate the suggested insurance gap 
by offering an affordable premium pricing. 
Structure 
Chapter 1:  
 
As seen above, this section serves as a rather introductory part, where author familiarizes the reader 




elaborates on the structure of the paper to introduce the order in which she presents the distinct 
subjects. 
 
Chapter 2:  
 
This part of the dissertation serves to define terms used in the dissertation in order to provide the 
reader with better understanding of the context. It also illustrates the severity of the cyber-attacks 
on the past incidents, in order to illustrate its potential in terms of the financial damage and risk 
exposure. Furthermore, this chapter will also highlight various ways in which are cyber-attacks 
perpetrated in maritime industry and include the discussion related to implications of such events. 
Lastly, the author unpacks the losses related to these incidents in order to demonstrate the extent 
of damage inflicted thereby, highlighting the attention that this topic deserves. 
 
Chapter 3:  
This section will discuss ways of dealing with the cyber risk management and how to conduct 
damage control resulting from cyber-attacks. Furthermore, this chapter also elaborates on various 
guidelines and framework order to establish how these can be used to assess and manage the cyber 
risks faced by insurers and the insured.  
 
Chapter 4:  
This chapter focuses on the cyber risk challenges in the maritime sector, as viewed from the 
perspective of both – the insurer and the insured. It further elaborates on the type and extent of the 
damage, potentially caused by these challenges to provide a better understanding of their 
repercussions. Lastly, this section also attends some of the challenges faced by the policymakers, 
in order to demonstrate the complexity of cyber risk implications on the maritime industry.  
 
Chapter 5:  
This part of the dissertation focuses on the insurers approach to cyber risk in marine sector. In this 
part, the attention is given to the pre-contractual and contractual tools that can be used to protect 
the insurer as well as the insured and elaborates on definitions of these measure. The discussed 





Chapter 6:  
This section of the paper examines and compares various cyber insurance covers. Here, the author 
selects a variety of products that intended to fill the existent insurance gap in the shipping industry. 
Furthermore, this chapter will also look at the similarities and differences of these policies in order 
to seek an existent clause that would be affordable and eligible for the future upgrade.  
 
Chapter 7:  
This conclusive section of the dissertation will summarize the findings of the paper and refer back 
to the aim of the study, set out within the chapter 1. Additionally, it will also define 
recommendations that will be of significant use to the insurers and the insured, aiding to mitigate 






CHAPTER 2: CYBER RISK IN MARITIME INDUSTRY: ITS IMPLICTIONS ON LAW 
AND INSURANCE SECTOR  
 
Definitions 
As stipulated in Chapter 1, the cyber risk is an increasingly re-occurring threat that 
significantly affects the global economy and those that participate in its various sectors.16 
To illustrate the above, the 2018 World Economic Forum’s Global Risk Report presented 
cyber-risks as one of the top five risks, as identified by the experts and decision-makers across the 
globe. According to Allianz Risk Barometer published later the same year, the cyber incidents 
ranked number two, representing a potential business operations interrupter for 40% of the 
respondents, moving up this ranking from fifth place in 2015, when identified as a potential 
concern by 17% of the businesses.17  
The following year, the Global Maritime Forum unsurprisingly aligned with the above 
indicated results, as the International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI), published a Global 
Maritime Issues Monitor 2019, where cyber-attack and theft appeared as one of the top five issues 
and risks confronted by the maritime industry worldwide.18 
Just to put the above into financial perspective, the 2019 Lloyd’s of London report shows 
that severe cyber-attack could cost the global economy more than $120bn, which is comparable to 
the damages caused by the major natural disasters, such as hurricane Katrina or Sandy. The report 
also points out the globally growing insurance gap caused by the increasing occurrence of cyber-
crime, as there seems to be a lack of cover options, calling for innovations in risk assessment and 
premium designs with the situation being no different in the maritime industry. As we investigate 
these various reports, it is indisputable that cyber-risks will not come to an end anytime soon. 
Instead, it is obvious that cyber-attacks on ships and port operation systems are here to stay, and 
 
16 Swiss Re ‘From emerging risk to core business: cyber attacks’, available at https://www.swissre.com/about-
us/corporate-responsibility/risk-intelligence/emerging-risks/case-study-cyber-attacks.html, accessed on 18 December 
2019.  
17Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty ‘Allianz Risk Barometer 2019 top 10 threats’ 
https://www.agcs.allianz.com/content/dam/onemarketing/agcs/agcs/reports/Allianz-Risk-Barometer-2019-
Top10.pdf, accessed on 20 December 2019. 
18 Marsh ‘Global Maritime Issues Monitor 2018’ available at 34 https://www.marsh.com/uk/insights/research/global-




the shipping industry needs to develop a sustainable solution soon from the prevention, risk 
management and insurance perspective likewise.19   
 
Cyber-crime and cyber attacks 
 
There is currently no standardised definition of ‘cyber risk’.20 However, it can be argued that 
cyber-risk is a consequence of unlawful conduct carried out by means of computers to disrupt 
one’s business operations. For present purposes a definition of cyber-risk as ‘any risk of accidents, 
incidents, financial loss, business disruption or damage to the reputation of an organization through 
a failure of its electronic systems or by the persons using those systems’, will be adopted.21Cyber-
attack is an adverse consequence of cyber risk. It can be defined as ‘Attempts to damage, disrupt, 
or gain unauthorized access to computer, computer system, or electronic communication network. 
An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise’s use of cyberspace for the purpose of disrupting, 
disabling, destroying, or maliciously controlling a computing environment or infrastructure; or 




Cyber incidents can be defined as events that ‘is an occurrence, which actually or potentially 
results in adverse consequences to an onboard system, network and computer or to the information 
that they process, store or transmit, and which may require a response action to mitigate the 
consequences.23   
 
19 Lloyd's Register ‘Tackling an evolving threat’ available at https://www.lr.org/en-za/cyber-security/, accessed on 20 
December 2019. 
20 International Association of Insurance of Insurance Supervisor(IAIS) ‘Issue Paper on Cyber Risk to the Insurance 
Sector’ August (2016) at 5,  available at https://www.iaisweb.org/file/618957/issue-paper-on-cyber-risk-to-the-
insurance-sector, accessed on 21 November 2019. 
21 North of England P& I Association ‘Cyber Riskin Shipping: Loss Prevention Briefing for North Member’ available 
on http://www.nepia.com/media/869527/Cyber-Risks-in-Shipping-LP-Briefing.PDF, accessed on 29 August 2019. 
22 FFIEC ‘Cybersecurity Assessment Tool Glossary’ published on 1 June 2015, available at 
http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/cybersecurity/FFIEC_CAT_App_C_Glossary_June_2015_PDF5.pdf, accessed on 02 
September 2019. 
23 Baltic International Maritime Council ‘The Guidelines on Cyber Security on Board, Version 3.0’ BIMCO at 50, 
available at http://www.ics-shipping.org/docs/default-source/resources/safety-security-and-operations/guidelines-




Cyber Attacks in maritime industry 
 
As mentioned in the definition of the cyber-attacks listed within this chapter, such incidents 
represent an “unauthorized access” to the third party’s system or communication. This, when 
translated into context of maritime industry and its offshore operations respectively, stands mostly 
for the attempts to disrupt the navigation systems based on the vessel communication; i.e. sent and 
received data. In order to understand the implications of cyber-attacks on the ships, it is therefore 
useful to elaborate a bit more on some of the vessels ‘communication systems that represent a 
target for cybercrime. 
In 2000, the International Marine Organization (IMO) published Guidelines for the 
Installation of a Shipborne Automatic Identification System (AIS),24 which required that AIS be 
fitted on all passenger ships as well cargo international vessels with 300+ tonnage and local 
voyages of 500+ tonnage, as of 2004.25 These AIS Guidelines require ship owners to install AIS 
that is capable of automatically exchanging navigation information in order to detect a possible 
danger on the sea, providing the vessels’ masters with the ships’ identity, type, position, course, 
speed, and navigational status. In addition, the system has to be able to transmit accurate safety 
information to other sailing ships and ports to avoid collision and to possibly help a fellow ship in 
case of emergency.26 The idea for installing the fitted AIS is to create navigation platform on the 
sea that would make the communication between vessels much more inclusive and therefore 
efficient. Besides the AIS, the IMO also requires ships to possess other navigational systems - 
namely Global Positioning System (GPS) and Electronic Chart Display and Information System 
(ECDIS) in order to increase the layers of accuracy and security. 27  
While GPS, which is part of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), works on the basis 
of communication with the satellite where position, speed and course of the ship are taken into 
 
24International Maritime Organisation ‘AIS transponders’ 6 June 2003,available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Navigation/Pages/AIS.aspx, accessed on 09 September 2019. 
25 Ibid. 
26Marsh ‘Cyber Gap Insurance Cyber Risk: Filling the Coverage Gap’ at 2, available at 
www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/marsh/Document/PDF/UKen/CyberGapInsuranceCyberRiskFillingtheCoverag
e, accessed on 07 December 2019.  
27International Maritime Organisation ‘AIS transponders’ 6 June 2003,available at 




consideration in order to determine the trajectory and time it is going to take to reach its pre-set 
destination, ECDIS is an alternative to nautical charts. 28 
Since the installation of AIS, ECDIS, and GPS on ships there has been indisputable increase 
in security as suggested above.  However, such implementation also means an increase in reliance 
on technology and therefore growing likelihood of attempted cyber-attacks.29 In other words, these 
technological navigation devices led vessels to be dependent on them and, as a result, the ships 
have become more prone to cyber-risks, placing them at a higher chance of being spoofed, and 
their navigation system infiltrated or hacked.30  
As for GNSS and GPS in particular, these are often subjected to the cyber activity with 
negative intent due to their influence on the navigation of the ship, as these satellite-based 
technologies advise the crew on the right course.31 Once manipulated, the suggested direction of 
the ship may be misleading as a result of the invasion and subsequent deliberate amendment of the 
vessel coordinates.32  
On the other hand, AIS is designed as a tool that can transmit  navigation information about 
the ship to other ships, the master and the  pilot automatically.33 When it comes to AIS, on the 
other hand, this system of navigation determines the ship’s current location (similarly to GPS), 
however, it also suggests the vessel’s identity, surrounding traffic as well as other details related 
to the carrier.34 Once again, such information can be misused and prepare the ground for criminal 








31 Arunabha Mukhopadhyay, Samir Chatterjee, Debashis Saha et al ‘Cyber-risk decision models: To insure IT or not?’ 
Decision Support System 56 (2013) 11-26 at 1. 
32 Lloyds Register ‘LR Warns of the Risks Associated with Marine Information Technology’ available on 
https://www.lr.org/en/latest-news/lr-warns-of-the-risks-associated-with-marine-information-technology/,accessed on 
20 August 2019. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Cambiaso Risso Group ‘Cyber Risks and Insurance in the Maritime Industry’ available at 




Cyber security may be defined as, ‘[t]he collection of tools, policies, security concepts, 
security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, 
assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and an organisation 
and user’s assets.’35 
 
Examples of cyber-attacks and their frequency 
 
To demonstrate the above on the actual example in order to achieve a better understanding, 
the author decided to list few examples of cybercrime incidents that significantly affected some of 
the major careers around the world. 
In April 2016, South Korea noted over 280 vessels having to return to its ports of origin after 
experiencing navigational problems at the sea, while sailing. It was later alleged that North Korea 
was behind these cyber-attacks which caused the ships’ GPS signal to be jammed, leading to some 
of the vessels’ signal to deteriorate while others received a false signal resulting in navigational 
issues also known as spoofing.36  In June 2017 the Black Sea region experienced a very similar 
problem of GPS jamming. In this instance, about 20 vessels had to return to their port of origin as 
the spoofed GPS showed the current location to be the Geldendzhik airport, about 25 miles away 
from the Black Sea.37The same year, another container ship heading from Cyprus to Djibouti was 
attacked by the so-called cyber pirates, where the hackers infiltrated the navigation system of the 
vessel and thereby gained a full control of the ship for a period of 10 hours. This caused the captain 
to be unable to maneuver the ship and the problem had to be resolved by an IT expert. It is alleged 
that the attackers intended to direct the vessel to a location where they would be able to board on 
to it, in order to commit a physical robbery act potentially even hijacking the vessel.38  Even though 
 
35  Lloyds Register ‘Cyber safe for marine,’ available at https://www.lr.org/en/cyber-safe-for-marine/, accessed on 15 
September 2019. 
36 Luke Graham ‘Shipping industry vulnerable to the cyber-attacks and GPS jamming’ 1 February 2017,available at 
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/01/shipping-industry-vulnerable-to-cyber-attacks-and-gps-jamming.html, accessed on 
18 November 2019. 
37The Maritime Executive ‘GPS Spoofing Patterns Discovered’ available at https://www.maritime-
executive.com/article/gps-spoofing-patterns-discovered, accessed on 18 November 2019. 
38 Tanya Blake ‘Hackers took ‘full control’ of the ship’s navigation systems for 10 hours’ available at 
https://www.asket.co.uk/single-post/2017/11/26/Hackers-took-full-contol-of-container-ships-navigation-systems-for-
10-hours-AketOperations-AsketBroker-Elousiv-IHS4SafetyAtSea-TnyaBlake-cybersecurity-piracy-shipping, 




these malicious intents did not turn into reality, it is clear that the incident resulted in delayed 
voyage, caused reputational as well as financial damages.39Last example of the cybercrime that 
illustrates the power of hackers for the purpose of this dissertation is related to Maersk – the largest 
container shipping company controlling 18% of the sea transport market. 40  It all began when an 
employee in Ukraine replied to an email unaware that it contained, the so-called, NotPetya virus.41 
On the 17 June 2017, the hackers used the previously achieved infiltration of the company’s system 
and targeted Maersk’s headquarters in Copenhagen, Denmark.  In turn, the already established 
presence of the virus led to a massive business disruption affecting Maersk’s facilities, resulting 
in the suspension of quite a few its port terminals.42 
Maersk’s business interruption resulted in failure to take new orders and all their daily 
operations were affected.43 The suspension majorly affected USA, Spain, India, Netherlands and 
other countries.44 The cyber-attack left the container shipping, port and tug operations, oil and gas 
production, drilling services and oil tankers inoperative.45 In addition, there was a ransomware 
attack demand in return of their files.46 The hacking resulted in Maersk losing at least $200-300 
million in revenue, costs of fixing its IT system, costs of 45 000 computers that were affected and 
needed to be replaced, financial loss incurred on upgrading and a new IT system installation, 
 
39 David Miranda Silgado Cyber- attacks: a digital threat reality affecting the maritime industry (unpublished LLM 
Worlds Maritime University Dissertation, 2018) at 32, available at 
https://commons.wmu.se/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1662&context=all_dissertations, accessed on 23 July 2019. 
40 Dromo Bureau of Shipping ‘Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management’ available at 
https://maritimecyprus.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/dromon-guidelines-on-maritime-cyber-risk-management.pdf, 
accessed on 04 December 2019. 
41 Jonathan Saul ‘Cyber threats prompt return of radio for ship navigation’ available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-shipping-gps-cyber/cyber-threats-prompt-return-of-radio-for-ship-navigation-
idUSKBN1AN0HT, accessed on 19 November 2019. 
42 David Miranda Silgado Cyber- attacks: a digital threat reality affecting the maritime industry (unpublished LLM 
Worlds Maritime University Dissertation, 2018) at 45, available at 
https://commons.wmu.se/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1662&context=all_dissertations, accessed on 23 July 2019. 
43 Dromo Bureau of Shipping ‘Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management’ available at 
https://maritimecyprus.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/dromon-guidelines-on-maritime-cyber-risk-management.pdf, 
accessed on 04 December 2019. 
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financial loss for replacing 40 000 servers and additional losses due to opportunity cost caused by 
this business disruption.47  
It is now clear that cyber-attacks in maritime industry appear in a frequent incidence posing 
a substantial risk, which is, mainly due to its complexity and extent, difficult to assess. Meantime, 
such events represent a challenge from the perspective of prevention as well as liability, 
demonstrating the previously discussed insurance gap and its scope respectively. The tools and 
ways the insurers deal with such challenges are to be further discussed in the chapter 4 where the 




Peril of the sea  
 
The section 3(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, defines Maritime Perils as ‘the perils 
consequent on, or incidental to, the navigation of the sea, that is so say, perils of the sea, fire, war 
perils, pirates, rovers, thieves, captures, seizures, restraints, and detainments of the princes and 
peoples, jettisons, barratry, and other perils, either of the like kind or which may be designated by 
the policy.’ Furthermore, schedule 8 of Rules for Construction of Policy define Peril of the sea a 
‘fortuitous accidents or casualties of the seas. It does not include the ordinary action of the winds 
and waves.’48 It is important to define peril of the sea as focus of this dissertation i.e. hacking of 
the navigation of the system of the constitute a peril of the sea risk. 
 
Marine Insurance  
 
Marine insurance claims are governed by the Marine Insurance Act 1906.49 Cyber risk is 
currently not regulated by the Marine Insurance Act nor subject to the Standard Form contract. 
 
47 David Miranda Silgado Cyber- attacks: a digital threat reality affecting the maritime industry (unpublished LLM 
Worlds Maritime University Dissertation, 2018) at 33, available at 
https://commons.wmu.se/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1662&context=all_dissertations, accessed on 23 July 2019..  
48 Section 3(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906; Schedule 7 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, Schedule Rules for 
Construction of Policy.  




Cyber risk contracts are currently regulated by the general law of contract. This chapter deals with 
cyber risks within the context of the Marine Insurance Act 1906; aiming at aligning the risks with 
the Act. This chapter will make an argument on how cyber risks should be treated as marine 
insurance peril; and how cyber risks contract should conclude using the general principles of a 
contract of the Marine Insurance Act. Subsequently, add pre-contractual/pre-screening insurance 
questionnaires. 
 
Marine insurance Act 1906 
 
The insurance contract is regulated by the Marine Insurance Act 1906.50 The Act regulates the 
contractual relationship between the insured and the marine insurers.51 The insurer offers to 
assume risks in exchange for payments of premiums.52 In establishing and understanding the 
marine insurance contract, section 1 of the Act should be read with section 3 of the Act. According, 
to section 1 of the Act, a contract of marine insurance is defined as ‘a contract whereby the insurer 
undertakes to indemnify the assured, in the manner and to the extent thereby agreed, against marine 
losses, that is to say, the losses incident to marine adventure.’53  
With regard to the United Kingdom’s Marine Insurance Act 1906, although it does not apply 
to all marine insurance contracts. Section 3 of the Act provides that ‘Every lawful adventure may 
be the subject of a contract of marine insurance.’54 Furthermore, section 3(2) of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 defines Maritime Perils as ‘the perils consequent on, or incidental to, the 
navigation of the sea, that is so say, perils of the sea, fire, war perils, pirates, rovers, thieves, 
captures, seizures, restraints, and detainments of the princes and peoples, jettisons, barratry, and 
other perils, either of the like kind or which may be designated by the policy.’55 Marine insurance 
policies are subject to the Marine Insurance Act,  failure to comply with the  Marine Insurance 
provisions of the Marine Insurance Act may  result in the contract being invalid.56 Currently, the 
 
50 John Hare Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2nd edition (2009) at 838. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Section 1 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
54 Section 3 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
55 Section 3(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
56 Section 22, of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. ‘Contract must be embodied in policy. Subject to the provisions of 




contractual relationship between the cyber marine insurers and the insured is solely based on the 
principles of contract law and not regulated by the Act. The reason for this is that cyber risks are 



























with this Act. The policy may be executed and issued either at the time when the contract is concluded or afterwards.’ 
F.D. Rose Marine Insurance: Law and Practice 2nd edition (2012) 155. 










As previously reiterated, Cyber risk is indeed a growing concern in the shipping industry. 
This applies not only to ship owners and port authorities, but also for marine insurers that have a 
mandate to provide reasonable covers that will reflect the risk in their premium, while remaining 
affordable.58 This chapter will discuss possible ways that can be implemented to assess and 
manage cyber risks from the perspective of insurance companies.  
As illustrated on the examples of chapter 2, there has recently been an increased occurrence 
of cyber-attacks, representing an extra risk that needs to be addressed.59 With rate at which these 
cyber risks increase and spread, it is obvious that the related losses cannot be fully eliminated from 
materializing and therefore, emphasis should rather be placed on the manageability measures and 
its implementation respectively. There are several ways the insurers can manage their exposure; 
i.e. susceptibility to risk. The other way is to ensure the risks they cover are clearly defined and 
the amounts for which they are liable to indemnify the insured are controlled. The other is by 
requiring that the insured manages the levels of the risk to which it is exposed to by protecting 
itself against such (i.e. prevention).60 Hand in hand with some of these preventive measures, such 
as e.g. two-factor authentication and conduct audits, the risk exposure can also be managed through 
the implementation of (and adherence to) the BIMCO and IMO guidelines, which will be described 
in more detail later in this chapter.  
 
 
58 Marsh ‘Cyber Gap Insurance Cyber Risk: Filling the Coverage Gap’ at 2, available at 
www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/marsh/Document/PDF/UKen/CyberGapInsuranceCyberRiskFillingtheCoverag
e, accessed on 7 December 2019.  
59 World Maritime News ‘In Depth: Cyberthreat Is Here to Stay!’ available at 






Cyber -risk assessment 
 
It is undeniable that cyber risks are difficult to assess due to their hardly measurable impact 
and mainly lack of data, which are often kept secret as such revelation may not only further threaten 
the security of the attacked but also damage their reputation.61 The cyber-crime techniques change 
rapidly and continuously making it complex for the insurers to keep up with the technologically 
progressive security measures that mirror the reactive savviness of the attackers. 62 Such dynamics 
and constant development of techniques and counter-measures troubles the insurers, making it 
hard for them to understand, quantify and assess the risks.63 When combined with the implied 
‘hogging’ of the valuable data, this process gets even more complicated in terms of its disputable 
transparency.64It therefore comes as no surprise that there is currently no scalable data model for 
insurers to assess and quantify such incidents.65  
In order to overcome such hurdles, the author agrees with the publication by the 
SAFETY4SEA, which stipulates that the insurers need to have a clear understanding of the risk, 
while the insured should be compelled to have a contingency plan in place, in order to mitigate the 
likelihood of the extensive damage.66  
The importance of such exercise is to narrow down the insurers scope of cyber risks 
assessment and guide them to deal directly with the challenge presented to them by the insured.67 
Simultaneously, the insurer should also instruct the insured to deploy adequate security measures 
in order to mitigate the risk exposure and, should this not be addressed, the insurer should not be 
liable for the damages or its full extent respectively. 
 
61 OECD ‘Enhancing the Role of Insurance in Cyber Risk Management’ (2017) at 111, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/insurance/Enhancing-the-Role-of-Insurance-in-Cyber-Risk-Management.pdf, accessed 
on 15 December 2019. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid at 124. 
64 SAFETY4SEA ‘Cyber Security challenges for the shipping industry’ available at https://safety4sea.com/cm-cyber-
security-challenges-for-the-shipping-industry/, accessed on 07 September 2019.  
65 Christian Biener, Martin Eling and Jan Hendrik Wirfs ‘Insurability of Cyber Risk: An Empirical Analysis’ Geneva 
Papers on Risk and Insurance – Issue and Practice 40.1-28.10.1057/gpp.2014.19 at 17, available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265727415_Insurability_of_Cyber_Risk_An_Empirical_Analysis/citation/






According to study carried out by the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority, there are several measures that the insurers can adopt to accurately quantify, evaluate 
and monitor the recorded patterns, while collecting the relevant data input related to cyber risk.68 
To achieve such optimization of the risk assessments and therefore also premium pricing (which 
will be discussed later), it is important, that the marine insurers engage with their intermediaries, 
actuaries as well as the policyholders, in order to gauge the risk while recording the details of the 
incident. In a long term, such input shall assist with the endeavor to achieve a reliable assessment 
of the threat likelihood, using the updated data in modeling, measuring and estimating of the 
impact on the business. Furthermore, such practice can also aid to determine the residual risk 
scores, top risks scenarios, control implementation and prioritized remediation guidance and 
expected loss range.69 Additionally, establishing a robust assessment plan can also assist the 
insurer to identify whether the insurance market’s preparedness is sufficient to assume cyber risks 
on behalf of the insured.70  
 
Cyber risk management and the cyber risk guidelines in the marine industry 
 
Cyber risk management can be defined as ‘the process of identifying, analysing, assessing and 
communicating a cyber-related risk while accepting, avoiding, transferring or mitigating it to an 
acceptable level, considering costs and benefits of actions taken to stakeholders’.71 Ships and ports 
operate within an internet dependent and digitalized environment, where operational risk 
management is inherently cyber risk management.72 Currently, there are no cybersecurity 
 
68 European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority Cyber risk for insurers-challenges and opportunities 
what is this source? Is it a report? Is it an article? at 4, available at 
https://eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Reports/EIOPA_Cyber%20risk%20for%20insurers_Sept2019.pdf, accessed on 
1 December 2019. 
69 AIG ‘Cyber Insurance: Executive Summary Report’18 June 2018, available at 
https://www.aig.com/content/dam/aig/america-canada/us/documents/business/cyber/cyber-executive-summary-
report.pdf, accessed on 5 December 2019. 
70 International Association of Insurance Supervisor ‘Issues Paper on Cyber Risk to the Insurance Sector August 
2016’at 25, available at https://www.iaisweb.org/file/61857/issues-paper-on-cyber-risk-to-the-insurance-sector, 
accessed on 10 December 2019. 
71International Maritime ‘Organisation Maritime Cyber Risk’ available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Guide_to_Maritime_Security/Pages/Cyber-security.aspx 
accessed on 10 December 2019. 
72Gard ‘Gard Alert: Managing cyber risks at sea’ available at 





regulations in place to assists in managing cyber risks and likewise, the shipping industry has been 
very slow in implementing and publishing cybersecurity guidelines. Fortunately, following the 
2017 cyber-attack on Maersk as previously described in the Chapter 2 of this dissertation, the IMO 
published Guidelines for the Cyber risk management. These guidelines are designed to help ship 
owners protect themselves from hackers, guiding the ship owners how to do so. 
 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) guidelines 
 
In 16 June 2017, the IMO Committee adopted a Resolution MSC. 428(98) titled Maritime 
Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management System (SMS).73 ‘The Resolution stated that an 
approved SMS should consider cyber risk management in accordance with the objectives and 
functional requirements of the ISM Code.’74  Furthermore, on the 5th July 2017, the IMO issued 
MSC FAL.1/Circ.3 Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management.75 Amongst the requirements 
listed within the above-mentioned directives, is the internal cyber risk management training for 
the shipowners employees whereby the owners and simultaneously policyholders (for the purpose 
of this thesis) are educated on the topic of cyber-crime.76 The authority thereby attempts to ensure 
the adoption of the guidelines, as it gave ship owners and managers until 1 January 2021 to 
incorporate cyber risk management into their Safety Management System (SMS). To enforce that 
the measures are indeed implemented, the IMO stated that failure to comply will lead to risk of 
ships being detained by the port state control of the respective countries.77   
 
73 International Maritime Organisation MSC 98-23-Add.1 - Report of The Maritime Safety Committee on its Ninety-
Eighth Session (Secretariat).pdf, available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Documents/Resolution%20MSC.428(98)%20-
%20Maritime%20Cyber%20Risk%20Management%20in%20Safety%20Management%20Systems.pdf, accessed on 
02 December 2019. 
74 BIMCO ‘The Guidelines on Cyber Security on Board, Version 3.0’ at 13, available at http://www.ics-
shipping.org/docs/default-source/resources/safety-security-and-operations/guidelines-on-cyber-security-onboard-
ships.pdf?sfvrsn=16, accessed on 20 July 2019. 
75 International Maritime Organisation ‘MSC-FAL.1-Circ.Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management 
(Secretariat). pdfhttp://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Guide_to_Maritime_Security/Documents/MSC-FAL.1-
Circ.3%20-%20Guidelines%20On%20Maritime%20Cyber%20Risk%20Management%20(Secretariat).pdf, accessed 
on 02 December 2019. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Gard ‘It is time to strengthen your onboard cyber security procedures’ available at 
http://www.gard.no/web/updates/content/26742440/it-is-time-to-strengthen-your-onboard-cyber-security-




Currently, the ship owners are still trying to meet the mentioned requirements despite the 
fact that the progress is very slow.78 Therefore, it is important that the IMO and insuring 
institutions sustain the pressure put on the senior management of the shipping companies, and 
thereby remain actively involved to ensure that the guidelines are thoroughly implemented and 
exercised by the given date.79 In order to avoid misinterpretation, it is important to emphasize that 
the recommendations as issued by IMO server primarily as a formal acknowledgement of the 
existence and severity of cybercrime in the shipping industry. However, it is quite essential to 
understand that the IMO guidelines alone are quite generic, rather serving as a mere reminder to 
incorporate security measures to manage cyber-crime. Therefore, it is of utter importance to 
recognize the references this publication makes to the best cyber security practices in the industry 
such as BIMCO guidelines and NIST framework, which are explained below. 17 
 
BIMCO -The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ship 
 
In 2017,  BIMCO together with other organizations (i.e. CLIA, ICS, INTERCARGO, 
InterManager, INTERTANKO, IUMI, OCIMF and WSC) published a version 1.0 of  the 
Guidelines on Cyber Security onboard Ships focused on creating cyber awareness and risk 
management measures, that will aid the shipowners and operators to deal with the cyber 
incidents.80 In 2019, the Version 3.0 was published, offering a guidance to shipowners and 
managers on how to develop the essential procedures and actions in order to improve cyber 
resilience, while maintaining integrity of systems onboard their ships.81 The BIMCO Guideline is 
intended to provide assistance to shipowners and operators on how to assess their operation risks, 
identify the vulnerabilities in their systems and thereby take steps to protect themselves. 
 
78International Maritime Organisational ‘Interim Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management’, 
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/piracy/Documents/MSC1Circ1526%20%20Interim%20Guidelines
%20On%20Maritime%20Cyber%20Risk%20Management.pdf, accessed on 12 December 2019. 
79 BIMCO ‘The Guidelines on Cyber Security on Board, Version 3.0’ at 1, available at http://www.ics-
shipping.org/docs/default-source/resources/safety-security-and-operations/guidelines-on-cyber-security-onboard-
ships.pdf?sfvrsn=16, accessed on 20 July 2019. 
80 INTERCARGO ‘The Guidelines on Cyber Security onboard Ships’ available at 
https://www.intercargo.org/guidelines-cyber-security-onboard-ships/, accessed on 20 December 2019. 
81 The Guideline on Cyber Security Onboard Ships V3 at 1, available at https://www.ics-shipping.org/docs/default-
source/resources/safety-security-and-operations/guidelines-on-cyber-security-onboard-ships.pdf?sfvrsn=20, 




The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships are aligned with the IMO’s guidelines 
(specifically resolution MSC.428(98) and provide practical recommendations on maritime cyber 
risk management.82 It is important to understand that the BIMCO guidelines are not a stand-alone 
document, as it is intended to be  a complementary and supplementary set of exhortations to 
existing regulations under the International Safety Management Code (ISM Code) and the 
International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS Code).83 The Guidelines focus on six 
critical aspects of cyber security awareness namely: Identifying threats and understanding the 
cyber security threats to the ship;  Identifying vulnerabilities within the ship’s cyber security 
system; Assessing risk exposure and the likelihood of being exploited by external threats;  
Developing protection and detection measures in order to minimize impact; Establishing 
contingency plans to reduce the threat’s impacts; and Responding appropriately to cyber security 
incidents.84  
 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework.  
 
Another set of recommendations on how to enhance cybersecurity (and therefore also risk 
management), is the framework issued by the U.S. agency called National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST). These general guidelines can be applied as yet another tool to manage 
and assess the cyber risks in marine industry and thereby help the policyholders to minimize the 
likelihood of successful cyber-attack.85 These five elements are characterized by the following 
keywords: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover.86  
The “Identify” component directs the stakeholders to develop the organisational 
understanding of systems that, if disrupted, pose a serious threat, while aiding the risk assessment 
 
82INTERCARGO ‘The Guidelines on Cyber Security onboard Ships’ available at 
https://www.intercargo.org/guidelines-cyber-security-onboard-ships/, accessed on 20 December 2019. 
83 The Guideline on Cyber Security Onboard Ships V3 at 1, available at https://www.ics-shipping.org/docs/default-
source/resources/safety-security-and-operations/guidelines-on-cyber-security-onboard-ships.pdf?sfvrsn=20, 
accessed on 15 August 2019. 
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85 Institute and Faculty of Actuaries Cyber operational risk scenarios for insurance companies (2018) at 8, available 
at www.actuaries.org.uk, accessed on 28 August 2019. 
86 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) ‘Cyber Security Framework’ available at 




process.87 Examples of such in the context of shipping industry may be the GPS infiltration due to 
importance of the system for the vessels navigation. In case of unauthorised access, the ships might 
end up in collision or spoofed, while being in the full control of the hackers. Hence, it is essential 
to have a master who is well aware of cyber- risks and trained on dealing with cyber-attacks on 
the navigation systems.  
The second element, “Protect”, aims to implement risk control management, processes and 
contingency measures, in order to ensure that in a case of cyber-attacks, the shipping operation 
does not get disrupted and can still continue.88  The part three and four (i.e. Detect and Respond) 
of  the framework focuses on the development as well as implementation of systems that can be 
used to detect the cyber incidents and adequately respond to them in a timely manner.89 The last, 
quite self-explanatory component, i.e. “Recovery”,90 represents the measures put in place to help 
with a speedy recovery from the cyber-attack; e.g. back up of stolen data and/or regaining of the 
ship control.     
It is critical that the above listed guidelines and measures are promoted by the insurer, 
persuading the policyholders to take all the necessary steps to safeguard against current and 
emerging threats and vulnerabilities related to digitization, integration and automation of processes 
and systems in shipping. In return the insurer may offer incentives for the insureds that complies 
with these guidelines, e.g. discounts for implementing the guidelines. Not only will implantation 
of these guidelines be beneficial as a risk mitigator for the insurance companies, but they will also 
align with the interests of the policy holders to prevent their ships from being attacked and/or 
detained for non-compliance with the IMO guidelines as of 1 January 2021.91 
 
As the aim, as well as some of the parts of this dissertation imply, it is essential that the 
insurance companies and shipowners work in synergy in order to achieve an optimal cyber risk 
exposure. The reason this dissertation proposes that the insurers enforce these cyber risks 
management elements to be implemented and complied with, is for the mutual benefit of lowering 
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the likelihood of the attacks and thereby premium, as this fee is determined by the its frequency 
and the cost to compensate such risk. Thus, it is fair and reasonable that the insured be the one 
identifying e.g. easily targeted navigation systems, making sure that these are not easily accessible 
by the hackers, while also ensuring that the vessel is seaworthy before the commencement of the 
voyage. Furthermore, as a part of assessing the risks, the cyber marine insurer can use the ‘Identify’ 
component of NITS framework to assess the frequency of the occurrence of the cyber-attacks and 
severity of the cyber-risks.92 
It is also useful to list other cyber-risks assessment measures that do not require any legal 
regulations and that can be implemented by the insurers in order to achieve a more exact premium 
pricing which will accurately reflect the reality. These include collection of past cyber data events, 
conduct of the interviews with affected parties including third parties and performance of 
qualitative risk assessment.93 Part of assessing the risks involves establishing how the risks may 
affect the shipping and logistical operation and trying to come up with the best possible risk’s 
assessment measures. Adhering to the NIST guidelines will assist the insured to identify the current 
and future risks and the extent of their impact on ships. Consequently, this shall also enable the 
insurer to create and measures that will reduce or circumvent the foreseeable risks. 
 
Data security as a form of damage control 
While some use the term risk management and risk prevention interchangeably, the author of this 
dissertation will refer to prevention as a ‘tool’ rather than management process discussed within 
the previous section. Currently, there is no standard method or modelling for the prevention of 
cyber risks.94 Neither BIMCO nor the IMO has developed cybersecurity regulations that may be 
utilised to prevent cyber risks, as these guidelines rather focus on the holistic view of risk 
management.95 Besides the mentioned, these current legal precedents in shipping do not cater for 
cyber loss and, as a result, prevention of cyber risk is very complicated.96 Furthermore, it is 
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important that, at the moment, the cyber risk cannot be completely prevented from taking place 
and therefore, it is more accurate to refer to such ‘preventive’ efforts as a damage control or risk 
minimisation. 
 
While the above-mentioned guidelines and frameworks target mostly the policyholders, 
while the insurers find themselves in a role of a ‘supervisor’ making sure that these are adhered to, 
this part distributes the liability for the damage more equally. Being the most active department 
that is trying to deal with cyber challenges, the cyber insurance market strives to fill in the gap of 
insufficient cyber related covers. Since the cyber risk problems result from technology, the most 
effective way to tackle those should be by implementation of cyber security.97 
The dissertation previously touched on the topic of data leaks or data breaches, however, 
besides the part where the author discussed infiltration of navigational systems and the related 
leaks of e.g. ships location, this issue was not given enough attention from the insurers perspective, 
despite being often critical for the damage minimisation.  It is important to realise that insurance 
companies store data that are related to e.g. cost of compensation in order to determine the 
premium. Likewise, these companies often dispose of details like cargo volume and available risk 
prevention measures, serving them to assess the risk. Should these leak – this will aid the cyber-
attack perpetrator to target the right ship, i.e., to find the right ratio between the potential 
materialistic benefit and security elements that have to be bypassed. 
Whether it is the insured policyholder or the insurance company itself, it is therefore utterly 
important that data security measures are implemented, in order to control the damage, which will 
once again result in a lower financial risk for the compensator (i.e. insurer) as well as increased 
affordability of the cover for the policyholder (i.e. shipowners).One of the solutions to data 
protection is undoubtedly the technology of blockchain, which works on the basis of decentralised 
data storage as oppose to conventional server storing. 98  
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As a decentralised storage (often referred to as distributed ledger), this architecture operates 
within network which is based on so called consensus algorithm, where the distributed nodes need 
to agree on the validity of the access. As the name of this technological advancement suggests, the 
data are stored in blocks that are further linked into chain of those partitions. Therefore, blockchain 
will assist the insurers to protect their confidential information or prevent any unlawful adjustment, 
additional or deletion of their (the insurer’s) data.99 Unlike the classic and comparably more 
obsolete database architecture stored in a “client – server” settings and therefore more prone to 
data alteration by the third party using an unauthorized access, the blockchain offers an alternative 
securely scalable solution. It is therefore very likely that the implementation of blockchain would 
result in a significant decrease in data leaks in a short- terms and reduce the cost of cyber risk 
related losses in a long term. 
 
Following the discussion related rather to physical security changes required to limit the 
damage for both – the insurer and the insured, it is important to remind the reader that in the context 
of this chapter, the prevention and damage control can be de facto understood as one. This is due 
to the fact that data security in a form of blockchain prevents the cyber-attack from taking place 
and, should it be attempted, minimizes the extend of the damage incurred. Should such concept be 
deployed during the incidents involving e.g. WannaCry and NoPetva viruses as described in 











As commonly emphasized in the previous chapters, the cyber risk represents a complex set of 
elements, which need to be addressed by insuring entities as well as their clients – i.e. 
policyholders. In terms of one of the oldest industries in the world – the shipping and ocean freight 
– this new phenomenon represents several challenges affecting both parties of the insurance market 
– i.e. the insurers and the insured. Unquestionably, cyber risk challenges are not only confronted 
by the shipping industry but other industries as well. The difference is the pace and manner in 
which these sectors deal with these risks. The shipping industry is slow in dealing and managing 
of cyber risks contrary to its increasing occurrence. It is common that before the insurer accepts to 
cover a certain risk there are several factors that they take into account. Such factors include the 
profile of the subject matter and the owner, the nature of the risk etc., as these are to determine 
whether such risk is insurable and if it is economically viable for the insurer. The following chapter 
lists some of the cyber risk challenges that are relevant to maritime industry, while having serious 
repercussions in regard to premium pricing. For better understanding, the author splits the 
challenges and their sources respectively between those faced by the insurers and those that are to 
be dealt with by the shipowners. 
 
Challenges affecting insurers 
As mentioned in the introductory part of this chapter, there is a number of cyber risk challenges 
confronted by the marine insurance companies. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this dissertation 
and in line with its aim, the author selected to only discuss several elements faced by the insurers 
due to their relevancy in terms of the influence on the premium pricing. Some of selected 
challenges include the following: cyber risk data collection inefficiencies, pricing and calculations 
of premiums, and risk of bankruptcy. As already implied in the previous parts of this paper, there 
is lack of reported cyber risk cases and therefore also deficiency of information and data related to 
these incidents which causes that some insurers refrain from covering cyber risk as this makes 
those events hardly quantifiable and rather unpredictable. Before elaborating further on the said 




offering cyber risk cover for the maritime sector. Stemming from not having sufficient information 
on the historical cyber losses and damages, the insurance companies struggle in terms of the risk 
assessment, coverage extent and quantification of excess, which leads to limited coverage and high 
prices of premiums as these are based on critical assumptions instead of accuracy.  
Lack of reported cases arises from the fact that the insured in most cases opt not to disclose 
their cyber-attacks ordeal in order to protect their business reputation.100 Especially if the loss or 
damage is not of a major monetary value or the respective incident does not entail a loss of life 
and/or significant damage to the ship, the shipowners often refrain from reporting such event due 
to their impact on the brand of the company. Since there is no law that regulates cyber risks which, 
in this case, translates as no obligation for the insured to disclose any cyber incidents they 
experienced, it is believed to be a fairly common practice most likely taking place even more 
commonly should there be a financial participation on liability (i.e. excess) incurred101. Therefore, 
the insurance companies end up having difficulties in developing a data model due to missing 
records of the incidents.  
As already mentioned, the consequence of unavailability of historic data are the inadequate 
insurance premiums and their calculation respectively, and as a result, the overpriced cyber risk 
covers. It is fair to say that currently, the cyber insurance coverage is more of an oligopolistic profit 
scheme, aiming at the financial benefits of the insurer rather than at closing of the cyber insurance 
gap.102 However, despite the pricing being done by the insurers, it is also important to note, that 
these are subjected to information asymmetry, where the shipowners do not provide enough 
transparency in terms of the recorded attacks. This includes the completed cyber risk cases as well 
as the possibly attempted cyber-attacks, leaving the insurer in disadvantage in terms of information 
access, and therefore adding to ambiguity in terms of risk profiling. Such set up causes an 
imbalance illustrating how important is the collaboration between those two participating parties 
(i.e. insurer and the insured), when it comes to fairness in reporting and true reflection of reality 
in a form of premium pricing. It is clear that when reporting an attack or related incident, the 
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reputation of the carrier may suffer, however, without such there will be no data that would aid the 
insurance companies to tailor a reasonably priced cover. In order to change things around, the 
insurers may also try to manage these challenges by including incentive packages in their insurance 
policy, to encourage the affected policyholders to report the cyber-attacks they faced.  
Furthermore, such incentivisation could be further integrated with the already mentioned need to 
adopt (and comply with) cyber risks management guidelines i.e. IMO, BIMCO as well as NIST 
framework, as discussed in chapter 3. As a result, the insurer will have sufficient information that 
may be useful to calculate and price their premiums, while managing the risk. This will, in practice, 
lead to enabling the premium to be priced more accurately according to collected data, and its 
availability at lower cost due to increased risk management measures in place.  
It is quite clear that on one hand there are no data to make a cyber risk a bit more predictable 
and thereby price the product in an affordable way. However, on the other, it is also the potential 
loss and its ambiguous extent that may simply represent too much risk for the insurers to take on. 
Should the insurer fail to specify the scope of the cyber-attack cover, it may likely result in 
significant financial loss or even bankruptcy. This, when combined with the unwillingness of the 
policyholders to pay higher premiums, creates the biggest challenge; i.e. establishment of the point 
where ‘demand meets the supply’, determining the market price. To reiterate this, we can use the 
argument echoed by the Lloyd’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Inga Beale as she highlighted that 
‘In 2016, the stand-alone cyber market reached an estimated $3.5 billion in written premium, 
suggesting that this figure will double over the next two years.’103 She further told the delegates at 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) conference in Paris, that 
the issue of cyber insurance is still ‘frustratingly immature, suggesting that the best way to address 
this ordeal is by establishing a partnerships.104  
In the context of this thesis, partnership would imply a robust corporative relationship 
between the insured and the insurer such as e.g. insurance pooling. The analogy for emphasising 
on the establishment of a partnership being that it is undeniable that any insurance company that 
intent to assume cyber risks losses or the responsibility to indemnify the insured for cyber perils, 







Therefore, establishing a partnership appears to be beneficial for both the insured and the insurer, 
as currently, the insurers have nothing concrete to base their premium calculations on. Hence their 
pricing is very high and, in some instances, exclusionary for medium and small shipping 
companies as they are unable to afford the monthly instalments.105 
 
Challenges affecting policyholders 
While the previous section dealt with the challenges faced by the insurers - primarily with the lack 
of data and the uncertainty of premium pricing derived therefrom, this part will put the discussed 
in the context of the insurers. Before we do so, it is essential to emphasize that some of the listed 
challenges are not isolated to impact one or the other subject of the insurance market, but rather 
both – insurers as well as insured. To put this in perspective, one of such issues that seems to show 
mutual repercussions is the mentioned premium pricing. While this issue represents a considerable 
amount of ambiguity and critical guessing for the insurer’s perspective due to lack of data, the 
insured perceives this challenge in a form of overpriced cyber risk covers. Notably, it has been 
found that some policyholders are unable to afford cyber cover as the prices of the products are 
too high, while are simply unwilling to pay the price.106 At the same time, some insurers argue that 
the reason they do not offer cover for cyber risks (or, if they do, charge exorbitant prices), is that 
the current entry price of premium that the insureds are willing to pay does not make a business 
sense for them due to potential of cyber perils and the related losses respectively.107 Therefore, by 
charging high premiums the insurance companies are protecting their business as cyber losses can 
be extremely expensive and may, as already mentioned, lead to significant loses or even 
bankruptcy.  
Another significant challenge faced by the shipowners (i.e. policyholders) are the 
qualifying expenses required to meet for the IMO guidelines compliance. Despite the published 
IMO Guidelines for the Installation of a Shipborne automatic Identification System (AIS) ordering 
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the ship-owners to have fitted AIS and install GPS navigation system, some ship-owners still 
operate their vessel on the old navigation system that is easily manipulated.108 
Although these requirements were issued as long ago as the year 2000, some ship owners still find 
it difficult to have the AIS installed, as this sophisticated digital technology for navigation of the 
sea is quite expensive, especially for smaller business entities. Therefore, such small carriers often 
rather operate using old navigation system than to have updated navigation system, increasing the 
exposure to cyber risk due to increased cyber vulnerability. While the pricing of transition onto 
new navigation systems, as required by IMO, may represent a financial barrier for the shipowners, 
this also complicates the operations for the insurers as they have to be ones dealing with these two 
conflicting issues around old and new navigation system.  
In this case, the insurer is more likely to charge the ship-owner that is not willing to comply 
the IMO guidelines; i.e. to have the AIS fitted, double the premium which is far from ideal as the 
stand-alone cyber product is expensive. Representing a reciprocal challenge, the insurance 
companies may, in turn, end up losing clients as the assured will then shop around for insurance 
cover that would suit their needs, likely excluding the cyber cover.  Such choice may be further 
motivated by the existence of the Cyber Attack Exclusion Clause 380, which, in default, prevents 
the insurers from liability over cyber-attack, unless stipulated otherwise. 109 According to many 
the Cyber Attack Exclusion Clause 380 is the biggest contributor to cyber risk insurance gap as it 
excludes the cyber cover from some of the standard hull & machinery covers.  In the past, there 
have been numerous attempts to remove or amend the exclusion of liability clause, however, with 
no luck, as some insurers are reluctant to make such change in order to protect their businesses. 110  
Nevertheless, due to the increase in demand to have a cyber risk cover included, some of the hull 
and machinery insurers responded by offering cyber risk cover under a standalone-product at a 
higher premium. Additionally, it is also important to mention that International Group of 
Protection & Indemnity Clubs have always covered the cyber risks losses except of the ones that 
are politically or terrorism motivated.111  
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It is therefore clear that Cyber Attack Exclusion Clause 380 represents a significant 
challenge for the shipowners – especially in the combination with other mentioned barriers.  
For the clarity reasons, it is certainly useful to quote an extract from the actual clause which reads 
as follows:‘...in no case shall this insurance cover loss damage liability or expense directly or 
indirectly caused by or contributed to or arising from the use or operation, as a means for inflicting 
harm, of any computer, computer system, computer software programme, malicious code, 
computer virus or process or an electronic system.’112  As can be understood from the above, the 
most unfortunate part of this clause is that it does not respond to the existing trends of cyber risks’ 
occurrence, as the liability over such is explicitly excluded.113  Furthermore, the clause also 
excludes incidents such as loss of life, damage to property, oils spills and collisions – should these 
be inflicted, while linked to any computer related attacks. 114  
Partially related to the above is the next challenge; i.e. misunderstanding or lack of understanding 
of the cyber insurance covers. In some cases, the insured do not understand the terms and 
conditions of the cover they subscribe to, due to complexity of the system as illustrated on the 
exclusion clause. Hence, it is important, that at the pre-contractual stage, the insurer make the 
insured aware of the cover they will paying for; including any additions that may limit the scope 
of insurance.  
Another substantial challenge faced by the shipowners is undoubtedly the limitation of 
claims of losses over the coverage cap, as some of the cyber-attacks damages may end up 
exceeding the selected cover.115 The most difficult challenge faced by the insured in this regard,  
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is a demand for ransom by the cyber-attackers.116The hackers would normally use Malware to 
infiltrate the onshore systems or hack the navigation system, in order to gain control of the ship. 
Once they have gained full access of the vessel, they make a request for ransom, holding the 
members of the crew as well as the ship itself hostage. The liability for such damage (i.e., ransom 
payment), should the negotiations fail, is often unclear and therefore, the insurer may get re-
insurances for cyber losses like this. From the perspective of the insured however, this can 
represent a significant challenge as the ransom demands are often high and the reinsurance for 
such liability non-existent. In extreme cases, such scenario may end up leaving the smaller 
shipowners with the only choice – paying the ransom and filing for bankruptcy. 
Next challenge that has been regarded as one of the top ten risks of 2018, is the possibility 
of business interruption resulting from the cyber-attacks.117  Self explanatorily indicating the extent 
to which can cyber-attack impact a shipping company, this scenario is feared by most of the 
shipowners. Therefore, it is advisable that the insureds don’t underestimate the need to follow the 
risk management guidelines and damage control measures as discussed in chapter 3, in order to 
lower the risk exposure. 
Last, but definitely not the least, is the challenge that was already acknowledged in the 
previous sections of the dissertation – i.e., damage of the shipowners’ business reputation.118 
Reputational risk was considered as one of the top risks in 2019 ranking, as it came at number nine 
out of the ten most significant business risks.119   
While some of the cyber risk losses are quantifiable and replaceable, the same cannot be said about 
loss of reputation as once it is lost, it may take ages to regain the trust and support from your old 
clients. In the meantime, the insured’s business would be losing sales and thereby face the loss of 
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revenue which may once again lead to the firm’s liquidation.120 Unfortunately for the insured, this 
is something that the insurer cannot be able to quantify or fix. Therefore, as previously mentioned, 
some of insured opt not to report their cyber incidents or cyber losses, in order to retain the status 
quo in terms of their business reputation. 
One the challenges faced by the insurer is loss of cargo. Loss of cargo is regulated by Institute 
Cargo Clause. Loss of cargo should be treated the same as a loss covered by the Institute Cargo 
Clauses. Insured should be protection should any loss or damage be incited by hackers.  
 
Challenges faced by the policymakers in Maritime industry: Contractual challenges 
While some industries can be subjected to the blanket application of laws, marine insurance 
represents a specific field, where the application of the generic form of policies often appears 
unclear. The author is of a view, that in order to achieve a better understanding of the topic, it is 
useful to list some of these challenges faced by the policymakers. These scenarios include the 
treatment of collision of the ships caused by the cyber-attack, causation involving cybercrime and 




One of issues around cyber risk loss or claims is related to collision of ships. Collision is one of 
the perils of the sea that is recognised, what is not recognised, however, is when this incident 
happens due to cyber-attack. When negotiating the terms of the contract, the involved parties 
should clearly stipulate what must happen in case when the ship’s navigation is hacked which, as 
a result, leads to collision or who is liable for collision that was caused by cyber-attack or spoofing. 
In this case the issue would be based on liability and onus of proof, which is also elaborated on 
within this section. As it is common that when one has suffered a loss before they can be 
indemnified for the loss suffered, they need to proof their clause and the cause and for a successful 
claim there must be a causal link between the loss and the damage. 
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The doctrine of causation is treated in depth in the law of delict.121 As causation is one of the 
elements that must be met in order for one to have a successful delictual claim.122 Causation is a 
factual inquiry and the test used is the ‘But-for’123 test also known as conditio sine qua non theory 
test. 124  Van der Merwe and Olivier explain ‘but-for’ test by stating that an act is the cause of a 
result if the act cannot be thought without the result disappearing simultaneously. The act must in 
other words be conditio sine qua non result, e.g. but- for the hacking the collision harm and damage 
incurred had the navigation system of the sea not being hacked the ship would have had a 
successful voyage. In this case the shipowner would argue hacking as the proximate cause of the 
loss.125 However, but for the hacking the master lost control of the vessel and end up colliding with 
another ship. Collision is also treated fully under the law of delict for losses and damages suffered. 
Collision liability is also recognised as a peril of the sea and enjoys legal protection by the Marine 
Insurance Act. 
 The main issue here would the cause of action. The ‘proximate cause ‘of the loss of the 
perils of the sea i.e. collision. According to Neethling Potgieter, an academic legal writer for a 
successful claim there must be a causal nexus between the conduct and the damage.126 The reason 
for this is that one i.e. the shipowner can be held liable for loss or damage that he has not caused. 
This is where the issues lie as in most cases the hackers are in a different jurisdiction with the ship. 
This might also raise fraudulent claims especially in a case of total loss as the insured may falsify 
their statement as state the reason for collision hacking, that before the ship ran aground the 
navigation system was hacked. That the hackers have gained full access control of vessel or 
offshore operations before the collision. For a successful claim a case of collision element of 
causation must exist and proved on a balance of probability. 
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Onus of proof 
The general rule is that who alleges bears the onus of proof.127 This principle is applicable in 
marine insurance and non- marine insurance claims safe to say in civil claims. The standard of 
proof is based on a balance of probability.128 It is very low threshold compared to the criminal law 
cases. The plaintiff bears the onus of proof failure of which may lead to his or her claim being 
unsuccessful. The plaintiff is required to prove his loss.  Applying the onus of proof principle this 
context collision as a peril of the sea, the shipowner will have to prove that indeed the vessel was 
seaworthy at the commencement of the voyage, that the master had adequate experience and 
qualification to sail the vessel and he attended cyber risk management training. That the ship was 
attacked, that the ship is insured, that the proximate cause of the collision was hacking. 
Furthermore, that had it not been the cyber-attack he would have incurred any losses and the ship 
would have not been involved in a collision. In addition, prove that the master did all he could to 
save the ship from collision as soon as he realised that the vessel’s navigation system has been 
while on transit to complete a marine adventure. Based on the evidence presented by both the 























The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the pre-contractual and contractual liability devices, 
as these are used by the insurer to rectify the risk levels. Such components and their terms 
respectively, should be considered by the insurance companies when deciding on whether to cover 
a risk and how to manage their exposure to liability. Currently, the contractual relationship 
between the marine insurers and the insured is solely based on the principles of contract law and 
not regulated by the Marine Insurance Act, nor recognised by the Standard Form Contracts and 
Clauses. The reason for this is that cyber risks are not recognised as marine perils or risks.129  
However, this does not the mean the cyber risk should be treated any different from any other risk.  
The marine insurers’ and shipowners’ contracts are currently regulated by the common 
contract law, up until the stage where cyber risk is recognised as a marine peril. 130Either way, the 
traditional tools incorporated or used by the non-marine and marine insurance are the same, when 
dealing with risk or pricing of premiums. Looking at the cyber-attacks holistically while taking 
into account various marine insurance contractual terms and the incidents covered (e.g., cargo 
losses, damage to the ship etc.), the author is of a view that such incidents should be recognised as 
a marine peril.  This can be justified by the fact that the incidents take place on the sea and often 
target marine adventure insured by a voyage policy. 
Pre-contractual stage 
 
At the pre-contractual stage, both parties (i.e. the insurer and the insured) need to agree on the 
terms of contract. It is also important that the insureds cooperate with the insurers and provide 
them with any information that is privy to them. At the same time, this exchange gives both parties 
an opportunity to discuss and negotiate the terms of the contract and establish how the agreement 
can be beneficial for both parties. At the commencement of negotiations, it is necessary that the 
insured provide the insurer with all relevant details in relation to the insurable property failure 
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which will lead to the contract being valid or void. Depending on the severity of the conduct, the 
insurer will be able to cancel or rescind the contract. Below is the list of questions that the insurer 
should ask the assured at a pre-contractual stage. The duty to answer all the questions honestly is 
indispensable, as this will assist the insurer in assessing the risks. Following the breakdown of the 
pre-contractual questions, the author will elaborate on the two important principles that need to be 
applied i.e. the duty of disclosure and misrepresentation.  
 
Pre-contractual insurance questions 
 
a) What does the cyber risks coverage include? 
b) Since cyber risk coverage is a standalone product by how much will the premium 
increase if I add cyber risk cover? 
c) How much is the assured willing to pay on premium pay every month? 
d) What is the scope of the cover and is the cover valued or unvalued? 
e) What are the consequences of a breach of warranty? 
f) Who is liable for damages or losses; whether is the shipper or the carrier? 
g) What will happen in a case where the assured’s insured subject matter is attacked, and 
the insured is unable to attach evidence to their claim form? 
h) What will happen in a case of a total loss? 
i) What will happen if the assured’s ship still operates on an outdated navigation system of 
the sea? Will they still be covered and how will their premium be calculated?  
j) How can the insured minimise and prevent their chances of being hacked?  
k) How long does the parties have before the cancellation of the contract? 
l) Is the insured allowed to have double insurance as a way of covering his loss or damages? 
m) What if the employee is disgruntled, is he responsible for cyber risks? 
n) What are the cyber risks assessment measures that put in place by the insured? 
 
The above list includes examples of possible questions that prospective insurer considering 
offering cover against cyber-risks might ask. These are relevant in terms of the context and the 




be mutually discussed and understood before entering into agreement. The offered cover, its 
conditions and the price of the premium respectively, closely relates to how the potential client 
responds to these questions. 
The duty of disclosure and fair presentation 
At a pre-contractual stage, an insured has a duty to disclose all material information to the insure 
in order to reach the conclusion of the contract.131 This could be anything from the number of 
times the ship has been attacked by hackers, the past damages and losses suffered at that point, the 
experience of the master, age of the ship, its voyage history as well as whether the vessel is fitted 
with the navigation system required by the IMO. Parallelly with the above, it is also important to 
stipulate whether the vessel in question is insured somewhere else. The reason for the above is to 
give underwriter data to assess whether they will be willing to cover the related risk exposure.132  
Furthermore, in case where the insured decides to cover the risk, the information given will 
assist in pricing the premium and also aid the insurer when drafting their contract, setting the terms 
and conditions in which they are willing to cover the risks. For example, such draft may include 
answers to questions such as e.g. what is to happen in a case where the shipowner sails the ship 
with a crew that does not have cyber-attack training and ends up colliding with another vessel 
where the term of the contract requires the ship to be sailed by a master who went for cyber risk 
management training.  It may also elaborate on the conditions under which the shipowner breaches 
a material term of the contract. 
  A duty to disclose information at a pre-contractual stage is very important, as failure to 
make a fair presentation could lead to the contract being cancelled. In terms of this principle, the 
insurers receive more information than the insured as they certainly need more protection due to 
existent information asymmetry. This is given by the fact that the vessels are in most cases in the 
hands of the shipowners who knows a lot about their history and have access to information that 
are unknown to the insurer.  Supporting the above stated ‘need for the fair distribution of relevant 
information’, the shipowner, in most cases, knows the hot spot for cyber-attacks and the 
vulnerability of the navigation systems of their ships. As implied above, it cannot be expected for 
an insurance company to have knowledge of the previous attacks and vulnerability of the insured’s 
 





vessel. This duty  of disclosure and fair presentation was initially imposed on the insured by section 
18 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 before 12 August 2016 when the Insurance Act 2015 (c4) 
(UK)(‘Insurance Act 2015’)133 came into effect.134 Also, it is essential to bear in mind that in 
instances where the Insurance contract does not deal thoroughly with the issue of disclosure, the 
Marine Insurance Act will apply. Subsequently, it is also prominent to emphasise that Insurance 
Act 2015 omitted the provisions of non-disclosure and misrepresentation. In this dissertation, the 
author first looks into principle of non-disclosure from the Marine Insurance Act 1906 perspective, 
before discussing it from the current law position. The doctrine of non-disclosure is embodied in 
the Marine Insurance Act in section 18.135 The notion of disclosure plays an important role in all 
insurance and contract law.  
Section 18 of the Marine Insurance Act imposes a duty on the insured to disclose any 
material information relevant to the contract at the pre-contractual stage that is privy to him or 
within his knowledge to the insured.136 At the same time, the section 18 (1) entitles the insurer to 
avoid the policy where the assured omitted to disclose material facts to the insurer at the pre-
contractual stage. Similarly, the Section 18(1) provides that ‘The assured must disclose to the 
insurer, before the contract is concluded, every material circumstance which is known to the 
assured, and the assured is deemed to know every circumstance which, in the ordinary course of 
business, ought to be known by him. If the assured fails to make such disclose, the insurer may 
avoid the contract’.137 Accordingly, the assured must disclose the material information that is privy 
to him before a contract of marine insurance is concluded.138  
The principle of material information is emphasised in section 18(2) of the Marine 
insurance. Section 18(2) of the Marine Insurance Act provides that ‘Every circumstance is material 
which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining 
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whether he will take the risk’.139 The reason the duty of disclosure is placed heavily on the insured 
is because the insurer, when calculating or pricing the premium, relies on the information provided 
to him by the insured.140 Thus, a failure to disclose material information during any negotiation 
stage of the insurance cover deprives the insured any opportunity to decide whether he is willing 
to insure the risks presented to him. As a result, in a case where the insured failed to disclose any 
relevant information a prudent the insurer would have to, the Marine Insurance Act entitles the 
insurer to repudiate the claim by raising a defence on non-disclosure.141 It is important to 
emphasise that the insurer may seek the contract to be void even if even the assured’s conduct of 
non-disclosure is an honest mistake, negligence or fraudulent as long the undisclosed information 
is material and ought to have been disclosed at the negotiations prior the conclusion of the 
contract.142 
The difference between the Marine Insurance Act 1906 and the Insurance Act 2015 (c4) 
(U K) is within the issue of breach of a duty of disclosure. The Insurance Act provides that, where 
a duty of fair presentation is breached deliberately or recklessly, the insurer may avoid the contract, 
refuse all claims, and not return any of the premium paid. Despite working in synergy (i.e. none 
of the above Acts are repealed), the current law puts the insurer in a better position compared to 
the Act 1906 as in case of the latter, the insured may retain the premium. Insurer would, in this 
case, be in a better position in a sense that if the insureds are not honest or make a fair presentation, 
they can keep the premium. 
 For the purpose of this dissertation, the failure to disclose all material information and fair 
presentation to insurer by insured should be regarded as a very serious form of breach, especially 
considering the consequential financial losses arising from cyber-attack. In some instances, 
depending on the cyber loss or omission the insurer should be given an opportunity to deduct 
certain amount from the insured’s premium before they return and cancel the insurance contract. 
Furthermore, in line with the aim of this dissertation, it is essential to understand how insurers and 
the insured are covered by the Marine insurance acts as these represent a significant risk mitigators, 
should the contract of insurance be breached. Therefore, such components and their deployment 
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should be reflected in the price of the premium, which, taken into consideration the ‘Exclusion 
clause’, will rise and fall in correlation with the cyber-risk exposure levels. Additionally, the 
premium price will also depend on how ‘bullet-proof’ the measures are implemented by regulators, 
as these represent an additional layer of risk management, predominantly from the perspective of 
the insurers.  
 
The general contractual terms 
A contractual term represents ‘any provision forming part of a contract’, where each term leads to 
contract obligation, which may, when breached, give a rise to litigation. 143 
In this part of the chapter, the author introduces the contractual tools that may be activated by the 
insurers, in order to protect their business interests, while mitigating and managing the risk through 
the regulation of liability. In line with the aim of this dissertation, this will serve to provide an 
understanding of the options that be adopted by the insurers in order to effectively deal with the 
peculiar challenges and uncertainty imposed by the cyber risks, while once again aiming to activate 
these in the favour of lower risk and therefore decreased cost of premium. As stipulated earlier, 
the high prices of the premiums and the Exclusion clause appear to be the main contributors 
towards the existent insurance gap. 
Indemnity  
The principle of indemnity is dealt with in the sections 67-78 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906.144 
Indemnity is a fundamental term of insurance contract and the insurer may indemnify the insured 
for the insurable property that is agreed upon.145 The Marine Insurance Act makes this a clear in 
the definition of insurable interest as it highlights that there must be a physical object exposed to 
marine perils.146 Furthermore, it also stipulates that the insured must have some legal relationship 
 
143E.Martin Oxford Dictionary of Law 6th ed (2006), available at 
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199551248.001.0001/acref-9780199551248, accessed on 
12 January 2020.  
144 Section 67-78 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 





to the object, in consequence of which, he benefits by its preservation and is prejudiced by loss or 
damage happening to it, or, where he may incur liability in respect thereof.147  
However, the absence of an ’insurable interest’148 in the subject matter at the time of the conclusion 
of a contract, does not invalidate the contract, as the agreement can only be invalid only if the 
insured is found to have been ‘gambling’.149 If the insured has an expectation of acquiring an 
insurable interest after the contract has been concluded, then it is unlikely that it would be found 
to have been gambling by concluding the contract. It is important to note. That the absence of an 
insurable interest at the time the of the conclusion of the contract, does not render the contract 
void. It simply means that the insured has suffered no financial loss and therefore the insurer has 
no obligation to indemnify the insured. Additionally, the insured is not obliged to have an insurable 
property at the time of concluding the contract as long as he intends to have that property or shows 
that he intends to have an insurable property and that he is interested in a marine adventure.150  
What is more important is that at the time of  the claim, the insured must have such 
insurable property in order to have a successful claim.151 In the context of this dissertation, the 
shipowners are required to at least have an interest in a marine adventure, if at the time of 
concluding the contract, he did not have an insurable property. However, as already highlighted, 
at the time of a claim, such an insurable interest must exist. Lastly, no insurable property e.g. a 
vessel, cargo etc. implies that the insured has suffered no loss and therefore, there is no need to 
indemnify him. The main objective of the insurance is to indemnify or reimburse the insured for 
the loss suffered in exchange for the insured paying an agreed premium amount in order to put the 
 
147 Section 5 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
148 Ibid.  
149 Section 4 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. ‘Avoidance of wagering or gaming contracts(1) Every contract of 
marine insurance by way of gaming or wagering is void.(2) A contract of marine insurance is deemed to be a gaming 
or wagering contract--(a) Where the assured has not an insurable interest as defined by this Act, and the contract is 
entered into with no expectation of acquiring such an interest; or (b) Where the policy is made 'interest or no interest,' 
or 'without further proof of interest than the policy itself.' or 'without benefit of salvage to the insurer,' or subject to 
any other like term: Provided that, where there is no possibility of salvage, a policy may be effected without benefit 
of salvage to the insurer.’ 
150 Section 5 of the Marine Insurance Act.’ Insurable interest defined (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every 
person has an insurable interest who is interested in a marine adventure.(2) In particular a person is interested in a 
marine adventure where he stands in any legal or equitable relation to the adventure or to any insurable property at 
risk therein, in consequence of which he may benefit by the safety or due arrival of insurable property, or may be 





policyholder in the financial position they were before they suffered loss.152 Depending on the 
loss, the insured may be indemnified in a form of replacing the property or in a monetary term.153 
Since cyber losses are quite extensive, it would be advisable for the insurer to cover the cyber risk 
under a ‘valued policy’.154 Since the cyber losses are always costly, it would be economically 
sensible for the insurer to offer cyber risk cover or indemnify the insured on a valued policy. A 
valued policy or fixed policy can be used a tool to limit their losses.’155 In a case of cyber-attack, 
the proximate cause for loss of cargo or demurrage claim would be a hacked navigation of the sea 
system.  Because, had it not been the hacking of the navigation system, the master would not have 
to face any offshore challenges e.g. loss of cargo as there would not be any spoofing or delay of 
cargos nor stolen cargos. One of the tools that the insurer can use to limit their liability is the 
mutual consensus; i.e. the insured and the insurer to agree on the sum insured.156 Basically, in this 
case, the amount of money the marine insurer is willing to pay for the cover. This will assist in 
terms of avoiding any confusion when loss or damage has been incurred. 
Excess  
Insurance excess can be understood as the amount paid by the insured when making a claim, prior 
to any action taken by the insurer to fix or replace the subject matter. Excess may only be paid 
after an insured has suffered a loss.157 Excesses can also be used as a tool that prevent the insured 
from claiming for small damages or making frequent claims.158 It is also important to note, that an 
amount set for excess differs from one insured to another, depending on the premium paid by the 
insured. If the insured’s premium is high there is a likelihood that insured will pay less on their 
excess and vice versa.159 In the shipping industry, the insureds are already complaining about the 
high premium. Therefore, in a case like this (even though risks are high), the insurers should try 
 
152 Ibid at 9. 
153 Ibid at 8. 
154 Section 27 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906.Valued policy. 27.—'(1) A policy may be either valued or unvalued. 
(2) A valued policy is a policy which specifies the agreed value of the subject-matter insured.(3) Subject to the 
provisions of this Act, and in the absence of fraud, the value fixed by the policy is, as between the insurer and assured, 
conclusive of the insurable value of the subject intended to be insured, whether the loss be total or partial.(4) Unless 
the policy otherwise provides, the value fixed by the policy is not conclusive for the purpose of determining whether 
there has been a constructive total loss.’ 
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to establish a balance, making sure that at least the insured pay a small amount for excess when 
they make claims. 
Warranty 
Another noteworthy term that is used by insurers to approach cyber risk, is warranty. It is always 
important and advisable to insert a warranty clause in the insurance policy. As this assist in terms 
of limiting losses and damages claims. In some instances where there is a breach it might assist 
insurer to escape liability. A warranty is considered as an undertaking or a strict insurance term in 
an insurance contract.160 A warranty is regulated by sections 33 - 41 of the Marine Insurance Act 
and is defined as a ‘condition on which the contract is founded’.161 In terms of sections 33 (1) a 
‘warranty, means a promissory warranty, that is to say, a warranty by which the assured 
undertakes that some particular thing shall or shall not be done, or that some condition shall be 
fulfilled, or whereby he affirms or denies the existence of a particular state of facts.’162 
A warranty is a condition precedent that impose a duty of compliance on the insured.163 
Furthermore, according to section 33(3) there are two types of warranties the implied or expressed 
warranties.164 For the purpose of this dissertation the focus will be on the implied terms so to say 
seaworthiness. A breach of a warranty from an English Law position has a precarious legal effect, 
an insurer is discharged from liability from the date of breach.165 The English Law does not require 
an insurer to make an election to cancel the contract, the insured’s non-compliance of a material 
term in the policy is sufficient. This principle was subsequently employed in Bank of Nova Scotia 
v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd, ‘The Good Luck’166 this case before Lord 
Goff was concerned with a breach of warranty in a marine insurance. Lord Goff made clear that a 
breach of warranty automatically discharges the insurer from liability from the day of breach.167 
However, this provision from the current law has omitted words such ‘as from the date of breach 
 
160 MFB Reinecke et al op cit not 157 at 295. 
161 Sections 33-41 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
162 Section 33(1) of the Marine Insurance Act. 
163 John Lowry, Philip Rawlings & Robert Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles op cit note 143 at 217.  
164 Section 33(1) of the Marine Insurance Act. 
165 Section 33(3) of the Marine Insurance Act. 
166 Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd, ‘The Good Luck’ [1992] 1 AC 233. 




of warranty’.168 The insurer is still discharged from liability, however, not from the date of breach 
of warranty. There are two types of warranties; the implied and expressed warranties. For the 
purpose of this dissertation the implied warranty precisely unseaworthiness of ship will be 
discussed. The doctrine of seaworthiness of the ship is regulated by Section 39 of the Marine 
Insurance Act.169 Section 39 (1) highlights that the ship’s seaworthiness is evaluated at the 
commencement of the voyage or marine adventure,170 Section 39 (2) establishes that the ship is 
considered to be seaworthy if it can’ reasonably fit to encounter the ordinary perils of the port’171 
and section 39(4) support this by stating that  the vessel is considered to be seaworthy if it has the 
ability to maneuverer through the necessarily expected or ordinary perils of the sea.172 In 
McFadden v Blue Star Line,173 Channel J held that for a vessel to be considered seaworthy it ‘must 
have that degree of fitness which an ordinary, careful and prudent owner would require his vessel 
to have at the commencement of her voyage, having regard to all the probable circumstances of 
it’.174 Furthermore, ‘A ship is deemed to be seaworthy if she is in a reasonably fit state as to repairs, 
equipment, crew and all other respects to encounter the ordinary perils of the voyage insured’175 
at the commencement of the voyage. Conversely, looking at these definitions of seaworthiness it 
clear that a vessel is deemed to  be seaworthy if it has the ability to encounter ‘ordinary perils’176 
of the sea and of the port at the commencement of the voyage.177 However, it does not mean that 
the ship will not be considered to be seaworthy simply because it failed to complete the shipment. 
As long as the commencement of the voyage when assessed the ship is deemed to be fit to 
encounter the ordinary perils of the sea. 178 
In a case of cyber risk, it is important that the insurer incorporate a warranty clause in their 
policy to protect themselves from unwarranted losses and also the insured. This can be achieved 
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by imposing a duty on the insured to adopt the IMO Guidelines for the installation of a shipborne 
automatic identification system (AIS). This is for the purpose of ensuring that vessel is seaworthy 
that the vessel is seaworthy at the commence of the voyage and that the hackers cannot easily hack 
ghost the vessel. Since the IMO Guidelines for the installation of a shipborne automatic 
identification system (AIS)’ requires ships to be fitted with AIS and GPS for navigation of the sea, 
any vessel that is not equipped with the required digital navigation system is deemed unseaworthy 
and considered as not going to be able to overcome any ordinary perils of the sea  i.e. cyber-attacks. 
Thus, in a situation where a vessel was spoofed as a result, the insurer would be automatically 
discharged from liability. The insurer’s defence would be that the insured breached a warranty that 
is material to the risk or the contract. As a result, of non-compliance of such condition precedent 
the insured sustained loss and damages that could have been avoided. Furthermore, it is important 
to note that the principle of seaworthiness is not limited to AIS it can also be extended to the master 










Currently the cyber risks are fully covered by the International Group of Protection & Indemnity 
Clubs. Like hull and machinery, the P& I Clubs have their own exclusion of liability clause. The 
reason for this is to limit their scope of liability. Since the outcry and demand for cyber risk cover 
some hull and machinery and some non-marine insurance have joined the force to offer cyber-
attack cover to shipowners. This includes Lloyds, AIG, Beazley Cyber Defence for Marine and 
Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty.  For the purpose of this dissertation, the following P&I 
Clubs and insurance companies’ policies will be examined and compared: Swedish Club; North P 
& I; Gard; Steamship Mutual; The American Club; Britannia P&I; Standard Club; Ship Owners 
Club; Japan Club; NEPIA; AIG; Lloyds and Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty. The reason for 
this comparison is to choose the most suitable policy that can potentially aid to close the gap in 
cyber insurance for ship.  
 
P &I Clubs and other cyber risks insurance cover policies 
The Protection & Indemnity (P&I) insurance covers is limited to risk agreed upon in their policy 
and subject to the Marine Insurance Act. P & I Club insurance covers shipowners for specific or 
only named risks. However, P&I insurance does not cover all possible risks or liabilities shipowner 
may be exposed and it is not comprehensive general liability coverage. Below are the different 
types of P&I Clubs and the extent of their policies. 
 
North P & I Club 
North P & I Club is one of the Clubs that does not cover cyber risks. Its policy incorporates the 
Institute Cyber Attack Exclusion Clause CL 380.179 Still, similarly other clubs, the North P&I Club 
excludes the losses and damages from the computer virus and war and terrorism cyber- attacks.180 
The North P&I Club furthermore, excludes the losses caused by computer virus. 
 
179 North Club P&I Rules (2019-20) at 46, available at https://www.nepia.com/latest/all-publications/rule-books-and-







Standard Club covers cyber risks, what is excluded is paperless trading and incorporation The club 
covers cyber risks if the loss does not arise from terrorism or another war risk.181 However, if harm 
was inflicted or perpetrated by an individual or group for the purposes of causing general 
disruption and for no public cause, then this would be very unlikely to constitute terrorism and 
therefore excluded in the cover.182 Furthermore, if a cyber-attack was targeted against a vessel by 
a government or organised rebels in a period of war or civil war, the war risks exclusion in the 
rules would come into force.183 
 
Gard P& I Club 
Gard does not incorporate the Institute Cyber Attack Exclusion Clause CL 380. 184 According to 
Gard Rules 2019, the Club is not liable for any losses, liabilities, costs or expenses directly or 
indirectly caused by, contributed to, or arising from harm of any computer virus.185 Furthermore, 
Clause 4  of the Rules provides that Guard shall not cover to losses arising from the use of any 
computer, computer system or computer software programme or any other electronic system in 
the launch and/or guidance system and/or firing mechanism of any weapon or missile.186 It is clear 
from the Rules that cyber risk losses  are covered as long is not war or terrorism incited. 
Japan P&I Clubs 
 
The Japan P& I Japan P&I Club’s policy cover cyber-risks is broken down into to external factors 
and internal factors. External factors are explained as unauthorized access, system hacking, 
viruses, social engineering and the internal factors as operational mistakes and includes general 
 
181 Standard Club ‘P&I Club and Defence Correspondence Rules 2019/20’ at 66, available at https://www.standard- 
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system failures.187 Japan P&I Club does not offer cover for any cyber risks inflicted by a computer 
virus. 
Britannia P&I 
According to the Britannia Protection & Indemnity Rules and Correspondence Class 3/2019/20, it 
is clear, when examining the exclusion of liability clauses and Paper Trading clause, that there is 
no cyber-risk exclusion or even computer virus exclusion.188 The Club /Association does not 
incorporate Institute Cyber Attack Exclusion Clause – Cl. 380.  
 
Shipowner Club 
Shipowners Club does not cover Chemical, Bio-chemical, Electromagnetic Weapons Exclusion 
Clause, while incorporating the exclusions of liability clause.189 The Club’s Rules expressly 
exclude computer virus coverage loss or damage.190 Furthermore, the Club excludes liabilities, 
costs and expenses caused by usage of electronic paperless trading systems. 
 
AIG  
AIG is one of the general insurance companies that offers cyber insurance cover for ships.191 AIG 
assists insureds to understand and address cyber risk better, with comprehensive services, support, 
while taking into consideration their business and protective interests.192 So far, the AIG cyber risk 
policy may be graded as the best cyber insurance policy.  
AIG policy also provides for bodily injury, property damage, business interruption and product 
liability and likewise includes third party damage to property and third part injury, as well as cyber 
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accessed on 20 November 2019. 
192 AIG ‘CyberEdge® Plus Cyber-attack related bodily injury, property damage, business interruption, and product 
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extortion and data breach. 193 Like any other cyber risk insurance, the AIG offers cyber risk cover 
as a standalone cover.  
Additionally, the AIG’s insurance policy is divided into the following types: 
- CyberEdge covering the financial costs linked to the breach, first party costs including 
event management, data restoration, third parties’ financial loss, business interruption and 
cyber extortion.194  
- CyberEdge® Plus which covers physical losses and damages caused by cyber-attacks, 
business interruption, first- and third-party property’s objective is to protect the interest 
and property of the insured, it delivers express excess coverage for bodily injury, property 
damage, and financial loss resulting from a cybersecurity failure.195  
The cover is, however, also subjected to AIG’s Exclusion of Liability Clause, which stipulates that 
the insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for loss that is:  
‘(a) arising out of, based upon or attributable to any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious 
act, error or omission, or any intentional or knowing violation of the law, if committed by any: (1) 
past or present director, officer, trustee, general or managing partner or principal (or the 
equivalent positions) of a Company, whether acting alone or in collusion with other persons; or 
(2) past or present employee (other than those referenced in Sub-paragraph (1) above) or 
independent contractor employed by a Company if any person referenced in Sub-paragraph (1) 
above participated in, approved of, acquiesced to, or knew or had reason to know prior to the act 
of, the dishonest, fraudulent, malicious, or criminal act committed by such employee or 
independent contractor that caused a direct loss to an Insured or any other person. (b) arising out 
of, based upon or attributable to any misappropriation of an Insured’s trade secret, any 
misappropriation of a trade secret by an Insured or any employee of an Insured or any 
infringement of patent, copyright, trademark or trade dress. (c) arising out of, based upon or 
attributable to any (1) presence of Pollutants; (2) the actual or threatened discharge, dispersal, 
release or escape of Pollutants; or (3) direction or request to test for, monitor, clean up, remove, 
contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize pollutants, or in any way respond to or assess the effects of 
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Pollutants. (d) for any Bodily Injury or Property Damage. (e) arising out of, based upon or 
attributable to any: (1) fire, smoke, explosion, lightning, wind, water, flood, earthquake, volcanic 
eruption, tidal wave, landslide, hail, act of God or any other physical event, however caused; (2) 
war, invasion, military action (whether war is declared or not), civil war, mutiny, popular or 
military uprising, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, military or usurped power, or any action 
taken to hinder or defend against any of these events; or (3) satellite failure. (f) arising out of, 
based upon or attributable to any seizure, confiscation, nationalization, or destruction of a 
Computer System or Electronic Data by order of any governmental or public authority. (g) arising 
out of, based upon or attributable to any Security Failure or Privacy Event, or any Related Acts 
thereto, which has been reported, or in any circumstances of which notice has been given, under 
any policy of which this Event Management Coverage Section is a renewal or replacement or 
which it may succeed in time. (h) for any profit or advantage to which any Insured is not legally 
entitled. (i) arising out of, based upon or attributable to any amounts for: (i) the original creation 
of; (ii) diminution of value of; (iii) lost profits of; (iv) or loss of use of, a trade secret, patent, 
copyright, trademark, trade dress or any other intellectual property.’196  
The AIG cyber marine insurance cover appears to be one of the well drafted policy as it 
contributes significantly to the idea of closing the insurance gap. The AIG policy reflects the 
interest of both parties and appears quite comprehensive, compared to other policies.  
However, the cyber cover might have a high premium since is a stand- alone product, but at least, 
all the covers are broken down in a way that is serves the interests of each insured. Furthermore, 
the AIG offers a cyber insurance that is more than just a compensation for potentially significant 
financial losses as it includes their advice on prevention and ways to respond to incident. This 
cover also constitutes of tips to improve the shipowners’ cyber resilience and suggests mitigating 
measures through their 24/7 customer care.197 
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Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty (AGCS) 
Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty (AGCS) is one of the insurance companies that has offered 
cyber insurance for years.198 It has been offering cyber insurance on ‘stand-alone’ basis, 
incorporating the traditional property and casualty policies.199 AGCS just like AIG offers first-
party and third-party losses. The first-party losses include a business interruption, restoration, and 
crisis communications while the third-party losses cover data breaches, network interruption, and 
notification expenses.200 However, similarly to AIG, the AGCS cyber insurance offers much more 
than just compensation for potentially significant financial losses. 
 
Lloyd’s 
Lloyd’s cyber risk policy covers a physical loss from cyber risk, indemnifies third-party for 
physical damage and business interruption loss and, in addition, offers a cover for crisis 
management, IT forensics, cyber extortion, digital asset restoration and privacy liability.201  
However, it is not clear whether the additional support, such as assisting the insured in a case of 
cyber incident crime management will be favored by the policyholders, especially if it means 
additional money on top of the stand-alone product. Examples of this include but are not limited 
to: credit, political risk, contract frustration, financial guarantee insurance, surety bond 
reinsurance, contingent business interruption, event cancellation and specialist contingency 
covers, construction delay-in-start-up, travel, directors’ and officers’, commercial crime insurance, 
errors and omissions and other specialist professional indemnity products.202 Lloyd’s offers 
insurance for perils arising as a consequence of terrorism reinsurance, political violence, cyber-
attack, health insurance, workers’ compensation and other commercial casualty covers, kidnap and 
ransom, contingency products, travel insurance, business interruption and contingent business 
interruption. 
 
198Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty ‘Cyber Insurance’ available at 










Lloyd’s cyber insurance policy aims to protect the insured’s business and responds to the 
growing challenges of cyber risk faced by their clients. Since Lloyds are aware that cyber data 
breach has serious implications on the operations and reputation of the insured, the company offer 
assistance in a form of consultation with cyber expert on ways to improve their security and 
mitigate the risks.203 Lloyd’s Data Breach Response Policy goes beyond the standard cyber risks 
insurance cover as it also offers a service which helps insured manage the aftershock of a breach 
as well as providing cyber insurance cover for the costs of notifying clients, forensic investigations, 
credit monitoring for customers, legal costs and public relations services to help manage any 
reputational harm.204Lloyd’s policy  offers cover  for third party claims and associated defence 
costs arising out of a data breach; coverage for the defence costs associated with regulatory 
investigations; for ransom demands and malicious threats; costs in relation to restoring the 
organisation’s affected systems; coverage for the income loss resulting out of interruption and 
assistance in restoring the data, network and IT system.205 
 
Beazley Cyber Defence for Marine 
In May 2019 Beazley introduced a new cyber insurance policy called Beazley Cyber Defence for 
Marine designed to cover physical damage and loss of hire.206 It is also a form of a standalone 
cyber insurance. Beazley Policy is more accommodative and effective compared to some P&I 
Clubs cover. Beazley’s marine cyber insurance cover is divided into two forms.207 The first cover 
provides for operational technology policy. The policy covers physical damage on ships and 
responds in the event of cyber incident. In addition, assist the insured understand cyber risks 
assessment and ways on preventing and cyber risks mitigation.208 The insured in a case of financial 
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loss of hire he can claim up to US$5 million and up to US$50 million for physical damage.ie. 
property loss.209 
Second policy provides for data and information technology protection. This cover cyber risks 
causing business interruption, cyber extortion data recovery costs, data network loss and 
eCrime.210 In addition, Beazley marine insurance policy offers cover for legal services, computer 
forensic services and provides accessible 24/7 call center services for their clients in cases of cyber 
risks threats. Furthermore, provides a credit monitoring, identity monitoring or other personal 
fraud or loss prevention solutions, public relations and crisis management expenses.211 
Arising from this exercise, the one common thing they have is that no P&I Club covers liability 
arising from war and terrorism.  It is also to important highlight that the P& I Clubs exclude 
coverage for property damage, loss of life, third party liability, business interruption cargo loss 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION  
 
For decades, the shipping industry has been known for being conservative and traditional. Despite 
this, it is now forced to evolve and address the cyber related risks, as these became a serious threat 
with the field’s growing dependency on technology.  
This dissertation was set out to investigate how the insurers and their clients deal with the 
challenges arising from such modernization and how could an appropriate and affordable 
insurance cover be facilitated, in order to operate to satisfaction of both parties, while covering the 
identified insurance gap. Simultaneously, the author puts an emphasis on the importance of 
investigation, recording and management of the offshore cyber risks incidents and compares the 
available insurance products to determine the best source of inspiration for the future 
enhancements. Although, the marine authorities introduced cyber risk management guidelines 
aimed at creating cyber risk awareness and cyber risk management, shipowners still seem to face 
the increasing trend of cybercrime due to rapidly growing sophistication of cyber-attacks and a 
lack of data related thereto.  
It is obvious that there has been an imminent need to minimize the potential danger of 
future cyber-attacks, as the IMO, shipowners and the insurers need to be more effective and act 
fast when trying to eliminate, or, at least, reduce the possibility of cyber losses. Arising, from the 
conducted research, it is clear, that technological solutions alone will not be not enough to prevent 
cybercrime. No issues arise if the attack is perpetrated with no damage incurred on the shipowner, 
however, should this not be the case the party liable for the damage has to be determined. 
Therefore, the onerous question of who is liable for the damage will arise, as the current insurance 
policies tend to include numerous exclusion clauses, protecting the insurer from bankruptcy.  
In examining these challenges, it was discovered that while the IMO and BIMCO have 
introduced cyber risk management guidelines aimed at creating cyber risk awareness and cyber 
risk management, the shipowners still need to comply with these prescribed measures in order to 
assist the insurers in provision of an affordable cover. The author of this dissertation is of the view, 
that most appropriate solution to cyber risk is cyber risk insurance coverage that is accessible and 
affordable for the ship owners. While the initial thought of such sounds rather utopic at the 
moment, this dissertation illustrates that this scenario can be achieved through incentivization 




exchange of additional benefits, and eventually even lowered premium prices as these directly 
correlate with the present risk exposure. Following the above drawn mindset, such packages should 
also target the motivation to report and record the offshore cybercrimes, as the available data and 
their amount respectively, will lead to increased predictability and accuracy of the risk assessment. 
By implementation of the above-mentioned tools, the marine insurance industry is likely to achieve 
a mutually beneficial situation for the insurers as well as their clients, as one hand, the insurers’ 
risk exposure will be decreased, while, on the other, the premium costs to the policy holders will 
continue to decline. 
For the sake of the further improvement and elimination of the cyber insurance gap in 
maritime industry, the author believe that the insurance policies, guidelines as well as the 
exclusions thereof, should be streamlined in order to achieve a transparent and client-friendly 
marketplace where the insurance companies work hand in hand with the policyholders, in order to 
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